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THE WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIREMENT OF WOLFF V.
McDONNELL: AN ARGUMENT FOR FACTUAL
SPECIFICITY
INTRODUCTION

In Wolff v. McDonnellI the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 mandates that certain state prison
disciplinary hearings observe procedural safeguards.' Among these is
the requirement that disciplined inmates receive" 'a written statement by
the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the discipli-

nary action"4 (a "Wolff statement").

The Court left open the issue of how factually specific a Wolff state-

ment must be. In particular, the decision failed to address whether a
Wolff statement that merely incorporates the report of a prison employee
by reference' is sufficiently detailed to meet constitutional safeguards. 6
Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of the written statement
1. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). For a more detailed discussion of
the Wolff holding, see notes 16-29 infra and accompanying text.
4. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).
5. A Wolff statement that incorporates a report by reference merely refers to the
report of a prison guard or other prison employee without noting the facts that formed
the basis of the disciplining body's decision. See eg., Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172,
1173 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[The reporting officer's] written statement supports the finding of
guilt that an attempt was made by Inmate Saenz to commit battery upon the [other]
inmate."); Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir.) ("We recognize and consider
the resident[']s statement,] howeverL,] we accept the reporting officer[']s charges.")
(brackets in original), cert denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1981); Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625,
631 (7th Cir.) ("The Committee's decision is based on the violation report as written and
upon the report by the special investigator which during your absence was made part of
the record."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977).
6. The courts of appeals for three circuits have faced the issue of the level of factual
specificity required in a Wolff statement and reached different conclusions regarding the
sufficiency of incorporation by reference. Compare Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174
(7th Cir. 1987) (incorporation by reference sufficient under certain circumstances) and
Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1412 (8th Cir. 1986) (incorporation by reference sufficient) with King v. Wells, 760 F.2d 89, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1985) (requiring factual specificity)
and Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 454 U.S. 907
(1981) and Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 632-33 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 959 (1977); see also Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 208 (8th
Cir. 1974) (requiring factual specificity); Wells v. Israel, 629 F. Supp. 498, 505-06 (E.D.
Wis. 1986) (not requiring factual specificity); Dedrick v. Wailman, 617 F. Supp. 178, 183
(S.D. Iowa 1985) (same); Shango v. Jurich, 608 F. Supp. 931, 940 (N.D. I11.
1985) (implying that factual specificity is required); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 585 F. Supp. 1295, 1298
(N.D. Ill.
1984) (requiring factual specificity); Ivey v. Wilson, 577 F. Supp. 169, 172-73
(W.D. Ky. 1983) (same); Green v. Nelson, 442 F. Supp. 1047, 1057-58 (D. Conn. 1977)
(same); Rice v. State, 460 So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (same); Martin v. State,
449 So. 2d 801, 802 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (implying that factual specificity is required);
Fichtner v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 285 N.W.2d 751, 760 (Iowa 1979) (rejecting incorporation); Heimstra v. Walters, 117 Misc. 2d 245, 247, 457 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (Sup.Ct.
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requirement and briefly outlines the kind of situation in which the issue
left open in Wolff arises. Part II discusses the general concerns involved
in defining the procedural due process rights of prison inmates. Part III
analyzes the arguments for and against factual specificity in Wolff statements. This Note concludes that factually specific Wolff statements are
constitutionally mandated, and that incorporation by reference, without
more, violates the due process standard enunciated in Wolff.
1982) (requiring factual specificity); State ex rel. Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d. 115, 124,
289 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 1980) (same).
The Seventh Circuit originally held that a Wolff statement must provide both the
grounds for the decision and the essential facts upon which the disciplining body's inferences were based. See Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 959 (1977). Hayes was the first case to face the issue of the level of factual specificity
required in a Wolff statement. Until Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1986), the
Hayes standard was followed uniformly outside the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., King v.
Wells, 760 F.2d 89, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1985); Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1286-87 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1981); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d
194, 208 (8th Cir. 1974); Dedrick v. Wallman, 617 F. Supp. 178, 183 (S.D. Iowa 1985);
McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 585 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (N.D. Il. 1984); Ivey v. Wilson, 577 F.
Supp. 169, 172-73 (W.D. Ky. 1983).
The Seventh Circuit seemed to expand the Hayes standard in Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d
1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1981). Chavis implied that a Wolffstatement
must contain not only the facts relied on but also a listing of any exculpatory evidence
and a clear indication of why the evidence was not believed. See id. at 1287; see also King
v. Wells, 94 F.R.D. 675, 686 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (interpreting Chavis as requiring a Wolff
statement to contain exculpatory evidence), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 760 F.2d 89 (6th
Cir. 1985); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 585 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (N.D. Il. 1984) (requiring
Wolff statements to indicate why exculpatory evidence was not believed).
The Seventh Circuit recently limited the holdings of Hayes and Chavis. See Saenz v.
Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987). Saenz holds that a Wolff statement incorporating a report by reference satisfies due process provided the violation that the inmate is
being charged with is not "complex." See id. The Saenz court cited Hayes, where the
disciplined inmate was charged with conspiring to organize a prison mutiny, as an example of a case involving "complex charges." Although the Saenz court also cited Chavis in
its opinion, it did not explain why the charge involved in Chavis, stabbing a prison guard,
was more "complex" than the charge that it was construing, attacking a fellow inmate.
The Saenz court conceded that "it would [not] be prudent and acceptable for prison
disciplinary committees to divide their cases into the simple and complex, and give reasons only for the latter" and recommended that Wolff statements be more specific in the
future. See id.
The Sixth Circuit has rejected incorporation by reference, holding that Wolff statements must contain each fact relied on by the disciplining body. See King v. Wells, 760
F.2d 89, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1985).
The Eighth Circuit holds that the incorporation of a report by reference is sufficient to
meet constitutional standards. See Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1409-12 (8th Cir.
1986); see also Jensen v. Satran, 688 F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir. 1982) (Wolff statement,
although "sparse in content" is acceptable if it is "sufficient to inform [the disciplined
inmate] of the evidence relied upon by the factfinders"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1007
(1983).

WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIREMENT

1987]
I.

THE WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIREMENT

A.

The Evolution of the Standard

The written statement requirement that Wolff v. McDonnell" applied
to prison disciplinary hearings was first articulated in Morrissey v.
Brewer.' In Morrissey, two parolees claimed that revocation of their parole without a hearing violated their right to procedural due process.9
The Supreme Court noted that a parolee's liberty is not complete but,
rather, conditioned on the observance of parole restrictions.' 0 As a result
of this limited liberty interest, a parolee is entitled to only limited due
process protection when faced with the possibility of parole revocation."
The Morrissey decision identified the minimum procedural safeguards
that must be met in order to revoke parole. 2 Among these is "a written
7. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
8. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
9. See id. at 474. Originally, the state did not claim that a hearing had been held
before the petitioners' parole was revoked. See id. at 475. When the case reached the
Supreme Court, however, the state argued that the petitioners had in fact received hearings. See id. Because this claim was made only in the government's brief and not contained in the record, the Court would not consider it. See id. at 476-77.
10. See id. at 479. The Court stated that, although a parolee was often described as
being "in custody," see id. at 483, the state, in granting parole, had given him the freedom
to do many of the things that non-convicted persons could do. See id. at 482. Consequently, the Court concluded that the parolee had been granted a liberty interest that
"include[d] many of the core values of unqualified liberty." Id. For a general discussion
of the state created liberty interests of convicts see L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 10-9, at 516-19, § 10-10, at 522-27, §§ 10-I1 to -14, at 527-43; Herman, The New
Liberty: The ProceduralDue Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger
Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 482 (1964); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
86-102 (1976); infra note 36.
11. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). A year after the Morrissey
decision the Court held that parole revocation and probation revocation were "constitutionally indistinguishable" and, therefore, the procedural safeguards outlined in Morrissey
adhered equally to a probation revocation decision. See Gangnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 782 & n.3 (1973).
12. The Court held that due process required a prompt and informal inquiry conducted by an impartial hearing officer near the place of the alleged parole violation or
arrest of the parolee to determine if there were reasonable grounds to believe that the
parolee had violated his parole conditions. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485
(1972). The parolee should receive prior notice of the inquiry, have the opportunity to
present relevant information, and, absent security problems, question adverse informants.
See id. at 486-87. The hearing officer should review the evidence on probable cause and
state the reasons for holding the parolee until the parole board's decision. See id. at 487.
The revocation hearing also was required to be conducted within a reasonable time after
the parolee's arrest. See id. at 488. Regarding this hearing, the Court stated that the
minimum due process requirements were:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detatched" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be
judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to
the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
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statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole."' 3
The lower courts that have addressed the issue hold that the written
statement required in Morrissey must be factually
specific.' 4 The
5
much.'
as
implied
has
recently
Court
Supreme
Wolff v. McDonnell,' 6 decided two years after Morrissey, involved the

rights of the incarcerated rather than the paroled. In Wolff, inmates
claimed that disciplinary actions taken in the Nebraska prison system
violated their procedural due process rights.' 7 The Supreme Court stated
Id. at 489.
13. Id.

14. See, e.g., United States v. Lacey, 648 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981)
(probation), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982); Shepard v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541
F.2d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 1976) (parole), vacated and remandedon other grounds, 429 U.S.

1057 (1977); Kartman v. Parratt, 535 F.2d 450, 457-58 (8th Cir. 1976) (probation);
United States ex rel. Carson v. Taylor, 403 F. Supp. 747, 756-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (parole), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1976); O'Brien v. Henderson, 368 F. Supp. 7, 9-10
(N.D. Ga. 1973) (parole). Until the Supreme Court made it clear that the Morrissey
written statement requirement was not applicable in parole denial situations, see Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1979),
lower courts construed Morrissey as requiring that a parole denial decision be justified by
a specific factual statement. See Coralluzzo v. New York State Parole Bd., 566 F.2d 375,
379 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 912 (1978); Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 9495 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff,
525 F.2d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914 (1976); Haymes v. Regan,
525 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, 500 F.2d
925, 934 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Craft v. Attorney General, 379 F. Supp. 538, 540 (M.D. Penn. 1974); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371
F. Supp. 1246, 1248-49 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part, vacated in part, on other grounds,

511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132, 113637 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
15. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1985). In Black v. Romano the

Court stated that "[t]he written statement required by Gagnon and Morrissey helps to
insure accurate factfinding with respect to any alleged violation and provides an adequate
basis for review to determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by the
evidence." Id. Although the Court has never ruled on the exact quantum of evidence
needed in the record in order for a court to uphold a parole revocation on review, some
evidence clearly is required. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (citing
Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973)); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 n.7
(1983) (citing same). At the very least, a reviewing court would have to determine if the
parolee had in fact violated his parole conditions. The written statement required in Morrissey could provide this information only if it were fact specific.
16. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
17. See id. at 542-43. The inmates made three allegations: that disciplinary proceedings violated due process; that the inmate legal assistance program did not meet constitutional safeguards; and that the regulations governing the inspection of correspondence
between inmates and their attorneys were unconstitutionally restrictive. See id. The disciplinary action challenged was the revocation or witholding of "good-time credits." Id.
at 546, 571 n.19. Good-time credits are a common penological device whereby an inmate
can shorten his prison sentence by accumulating credits for good behavior. See id. at 547,
557; Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 447 (1985); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161, 4162
(1982); 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.1 to .17 (1986); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 127 § 129 (LCP
1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,107 (1986). The disciplinary procedures that the inmates
challenged, and that the Court found to be constitutionally inadequate, consisted of a
preliminary conference in which the inmate was informed of the charges against him and
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that the disciplinary action complained of implicated legitimate liberty
interests held by the inmates"8 and, therefore, required that they be afforded certain due process protections.1 9 The Court held, however, that
the level of protection required under Morrissey for parole revocation
does not adhere in prison disciplinary actions.20 This is because the liberty interest at stake for inmates faced with disciplinary action is less
than that of parolees faced with imprisonment by revocation of their
parole.2 1
The Wolff court, however, did adopt Morrissey's written statement requirement. 22 Wolff held that inmates must receive "a 'written statement
by the factfmders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action." 23 There is one exception to this requirement: if institua subsequent hearing in which a conduct report that had been prepared on the inmate
was read to him. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1972).
18. The Court held that, in providing a statutory right to good-time credits and conditioning their revocation on serious misconduct, the state had created a liberty interest
implicating the due process clause. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
The nature of good-time credits is such that they invariably seem to create a liberty interest. See Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973); supra notes 17 & 36. Indeed,
in litigation involving the loss of good-time credits the state generally concedes that it has
created a liberty interest in granting them. See, eg., Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
453 (1985); Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1410 (8th Cir. 1986); King v. Wells, 760 F.2d
89, 92 (6th Cir. 1985).
The Wolff Court also held that, because under Nebraska law the same procedures
were employed when disciplinary confinement was imposed, the same due process protections required for the revocation of good-time credits would adhere to the imposition of
disciplinary confinement. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571 n.19.
19. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The Court stated that
[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary
action of government ....Since prisoners in Nebraska can only lose good-time
credits if they are guilty of serious misconduct, the determination of whether
such behavior has occurred becomes critical, and the minimum requirements of
procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed.
Id. at 558 (citation omitted). See infra note 36.
20. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974). The Court of Appeals in
Wolff had held that the Morrissey safeguards generally were applicable to prison disciplinary cases. See McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part.
rev'd in part, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
21. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974); see also Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (discussing the liberty interests held by a parolee).
The Wolff Court also observed that the potentially volatile nature of the prison environment gave the state a greater interest in maintaining flexibility of its procedures in the
prison context than in the parole context. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561-62. It noted that
prison is
a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to
violate the criminal law and who ....may have little regard for the safety of
others or their property or for the rules designed to provide an orderly and
reasonably safe prison life.... Guards and inmates co-exist in direct and intimate contact. Tension between them is unremitting.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561-62; see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456 (1985)
(prison disciplinary proceedings take place in "a highly charged atmosphere").
22. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974).
23. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-65 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972)).
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tional or personal safety is implicated, certain items of evidence can be

omitted, provided the omissions are indicated in the statement.2 4
A Wolff statement serves two purposes. The first is to protect the inmate from the immediate consequences of an arbitrary decision. 25 A

Wolff statement is meant to ensure that the disciplining body acts fairly
by making the basis of its decision readily reviewable by the public, state
officials, and the courts.26

The second purpose of a Wolff statement is to protect the inmate from

"collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of the nature of

the original proceeding."2 7 For instance, a disciplinary action may result

in a decision to transfer an inmate and is certain to influence his opportu-

nity for parole. 2s A written record ensures greater accuracy in this process by allowing the collateral decisionmaker to accord each disciplinary
action its appropriate weight.2 9
One question left open by the Wolff decision is how specific a Wolff
24. See id. at 565.
25. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565. These consequences often include loss of good-time
credits and solitary confinement. See, e.g., Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 448
(1985); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 493 (1985); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 31213 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 547 (1974); Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281,
1283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1981); Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 628
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); King v. Wells, 94 F.R.D. 675, 679 (E.D.
Mich. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 760 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1985).
26. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974). The Wolff Court stated that
the provision for a written record helps to insure that administrators, faced with
possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts,
where fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly.
Without written records, the inmate will be at a severe disadvantage in propounding his own cause to or defending himself from others.
Id. See Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1410 (8th Cir. 1986); Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d
1281, 1287 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1981); Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625,
631 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); Dedrick v. Wallman, 617 F. Supp. 178,
183 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Rinehart v. Brewer, 483 F. Supp. 165, 170 (S.D. Iowa 1980); State
ex rel. Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d. 115, 123, 289 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 1980); cf.
Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 95 (2d Cir.) (statement of evidence required for parole
revocation protects against arbitrary and capricious decisions), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914
(1977); United States ex reL Johnson v. Chairman, 500 F.2d 925, 929 (2d Cir.) (statement
of evidence required for parole denial protects against arbitrary and capricious decisions),
vacatedas moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Craft v. Attorney General, 379 F. Supp. 538, 540
(M.D. Pa. 1974) (same).
27. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
28. See id.; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1979) (inmate's prison behavior record is generally a critical factor in
the decision whether to grant parole); Dye v. United States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d
1376, 1378 (10th Cir. 1977) (loss of good-time credits "is an indication that a prisoner has
violated the rules of the institution to a serious degree"); State ex reL Meeks v. Gagnon,
95 Wis. 2d 115, 123, 289 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 1980) (same); 28 C.F.R. § 2.6 (1986)
(loss of good-time credits taken into consideration in federal parole decision).
29. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974); Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407,
1410 (8th Cir. 1986); Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 959 (1977); State ex rel. Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 123, 289 N.W.2d 357,
363 (Ct. App. 1980).
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statement should be. a" This issue typically arises in the following situation. A disturbance occurs in prison. Prison personnel file written reports about the incident with the administration. On the basis of these
reports, and perhaps other evidence, prison officials accuse an inmate of
violating the institution's regulations and convene a disciplinary hearing.31 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the inmate
actually has violated the rules and, if so, what action should be taken. If
an inmate is found guilty, he must receive a Wolff statement from the
disciplining body.32
A constitutional problem arises when the Wolff statement contains
nothing more than a statement that the inmate has been found guilty
based on a prison employee's report.3 3 Presumably, the incriminating
evidence on which the disciplining body based its decision is contained in
the employee's report.3 4 To determine whether the incorporation of this
report by reference satisfies due process requires a proper understanding
of the concerns that guide any inquiry into the procedural due process
rights of inmates.
30. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 541.17 (1986) (outlining procedures to be followed in federal
inmate disciplinary hearings). Wolff requires that an inmate be given notice of the
charges against him at least twenty-four hours before a disciplinary hearing is convened
in order to provide him an opportunity to "marshal the facts in his defense and to clarify
what the charges are. . .

."

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974).

32. See id. at 564-65.
33. For instance, the Wo.ff statement found to be adequate in Saenz v. Young, 811
F.2d 1172 (7th Cir. 1987) stated simply that "[the reporting officer's] written statement
supports the finding of guilt that an attempt was made by Inmate Saenz to commit battery upon the [other] inmate." Id. at 1173. The Wolff statement found inadequate in
Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1981), read, in its
entirety: "We recognize and consider the resident[']s statement[,] however[,] we accept
the reporting officer[']s charges." Id. at 1283 (brackets in original). The "reporting officer's charges" consisted of a report that stated no more than that an investigation had
identified the inmate as the attacker of a prison guard. See id. The Wolffstatement found
inadequate in Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977),
said only that "the Committee's decision is based on the violation report as written and
upon the report by the special investigator which during your absence was made part of
the record." Id. at 631.
34. See, e.g., Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Here it is plain
that the [disciplining body] relied on the reporting officer's [report]."); Brown v. Frey,
807 F.2d 1407, 1413 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[A]n examination of the reports makes it immediately apparent what statements in them were relied on by the board in making its decision."). But see, e.g., Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir.) (report that was
incorporated stated no more than that an investigation had identified the inmate as the
attacker of a prison guard), cert denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1981).
An inmate sometimes receives a copy of the incorporated report. See. e.g., King v.
Wells, 760 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1985). In King, where the court required factually specific Wolff statements, the disciplined inmate received a Wolff statement and a copy of the
incorporated reports. The court held this to be inadequate because Wolff required the
factually specific statement to be produced by the disciplining body, not a prison guard.
See King, 760 F.2d at 93. Providing an inmate with a copy of an incorporated report
does not alleviate the inadequacies of incorporation by reference. See infra note 59 and
accompanying text.
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THE GUIDING CONCERNS

The Constitution provides that a person cannot be deprived of liberty
without due process of law.35 In determining the level of process due an
inmate facing the loss of a liberty interest,3 6 a balance must be struck
between the liberty interest at stake and the legitimate penological interests of the state. 3 7 Three primary concerns influence this balancing pro35. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that
"[n]o state.. . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. . . ." Id.
36. "Prisoners may also claim the protection of the Due Process Clause. They may
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
A valid conviction constitutionally deprives an inmate of the right to a great deal of the
liberty to which non-convicted persons are entitled. See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal &
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980);
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948). Thus, the Constitution, standing alone, does not guarantee procedural due process in the decision to place an inmate in administrative segregation, see Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), or to transfer an inmate to another prison. See Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (interstate transfer); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 228 (1976) (intrastate transfer). But see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)
(inmate retains "residuum of liberty" requiring procedural due process in the decision to
transfer him to mental hospital). Similarly, the Constitution does not require the state to
release an inmate from prison before serving his full sentence. See Jago v. Van Curen, 454
U.S. 14, 16-17 (1981); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S, 458, 463-64
(1981) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 7 (1979)); Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488.
However, if the state sets up a procedure that limits the discretion of the prison administration and conditions what happens to the inmate on the occurrence of certain events,
then the state has created a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. See Olim
v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
U.S. 458, 465 (1981); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226-27 (1976); Wolff v. McDon-

nell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397, 402-03 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978). In the Court's words,
a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on
official discretion. An inmate must show 'that particularized standards or criteria guide the State's decisionmakers.' If the decisionmaker is not 'required to
base its decisions on objective and defined criteria,'.., the State has not created
a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (citations omitted) (quoting Connecticut
Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Thus, even transfer and administrative segregation decisions may require procedural
due process if made pursuant to a rule limiting administrative discretion. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (administrative segregation); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 487-88, 489 (1980) (transfer); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 24950 (1983) (even a rule setting up a particular procedure may be violated without due
process ramifications if it leaves the ultimate decision to the discretion of an administrator). For a general discussion of the constitutional protections afforded state created liberty interests, see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-9 at 514-19, § 10-10, at
522-27, §§ 10-11 to -14, at 527-43; Herman, The New Liberty: The ProceduralDue Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 482
(1984); The Supreme Court 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 86-104 (1976).
37. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S.
491, 495 (1985); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
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cess. The first concern is the nature of the administrative decision being
made. Specifically, the threshold question is whether the decision to re-

voke a liberty interest is premised on the occurence of certain specified

events.3 8 If so, the decisionmaking process generally should contain procedural safeguards,39 including the opportunity for an adversarial hearing." On the other hand, if the decision is based largely on predictions
480, 495-96 (1980); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 321, 324 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 572 (1974).
38. See supra note 36; see eg., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (conditioning the revocation of good-time credits on the violation of prison rules triggers due
process protection); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489-91 (1980) (conditioning transferal
to a state mental hospital on the onset of mental disease gives rise to due process
protection).
39. Compare Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489-91, 495 (1980) (decision to commit
inmate to mental hospital requires procedural safeguards because it is based on an inquiry
into inmate's mental health) and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974) (decision to discipline inmate requires due process protection because it is based on a determination of whether he is guilty of rules violations) with Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,
249-50 (1983) (decision to transfer inmate requires no procedural protections because
prison administration vested with unfettered discretion) and Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) (parole denial decision
does not require due process protections because it is based on predictions rather than the
sort of guilt determination ordinarily associated with an adversarial proceeding); cf Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (decision to revoke parole triggers due process
protection because it is based on the factual determination of whether the parolee violated
his parole conditions).
40. When the revocation of a liberty interest is premised on the occurrence of certain
events, the operative question is whether these events occurred. See supra note 36; see also
Wolff, at 558 (1974) ("Since prisoners in Nebraska can only lose good-time credits if they
are guilty of serious misconduct, the determination of whether such behavior has occurred becomes critical, and ... due process... must be observed."). This determination
requires the sort of factual inquiry associated with an adversarial proceeding. For instance, in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), state law provided that inmates could be
committed to a mental hospital (and suffer a corresponding and severe loss of liberty)
only if it was determined that they were mentally ill. See id. at 489-91. Due process
required that this determination be made pursuant to an adversarial hearing. Id. at 49091, 495. Similarly, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), inmates could lose goodtime credits (a liberty interest) only if they violated prison rules. Id. at 547, 557. Therefore, when accused of rules violations, inmates had to be given a hearing and the opportunity to marshal the facts in their defense. Id. at 557-58, 564. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1972) (because decision to revoke parole is premised on a finding of
violation of parole restrictions, a factual hearing is required before parole can be revoked).
In contrast, if a change in an inmate's status or environment is not conditioned on the
occurrence of certain events but left to the discretion of prison administrators, then the
question is not whether certain facts occurred but what course of action an administrator
thinks is best. This sort of decision ordinarily is not associated with an adversarial, fact
determining hearing. See eg., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1983) (where
prison administration possesses unfettered discretion in inmate transfer decision, there is
no need for procedural protections); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1983) (because administrative segregation is discretionary, it does not require a hearing before imposition); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (because it
is based more on predictions than objective facts, decision whether to commute sentence
does not require procedural protections); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal &
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1979) (because parole decision is largely discretionary, it does not require an adversarial fact finding hearing).
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of future conduct or conditions-the type of decision ordinarily not associated with an adversarial factfinding proceeding-procedural safeguards
are less relevant.41
The second concern that influences the balancing process is the effect
that the administrative decision may have on the inmate.42 This concern
encompasses both the immediate harm that the inmate will suffer due to
the loss of the liberty interest43 as well as the risk of subsequent and
unjustified "collateral consequences" ' he may be exposed to as a result
of the decision.4 5 The need for procedural safeguards increases as the
potential for negative effects arising from the decision increases.4 6
The third concern focuses on the interests of the state prison administration.4 7 All other factors being equal, the less burden that a procedural
41. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1983) (because prison administration has unfettered discretion to transfer inmates, no procedural protections adhere to transfer decision); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474 (1983) (because
administrative segregation decision based on "purely subjective evaluation,....
trial-type
procedural safeguards" are not required); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (because decision to commute sentence depends on predictions and
subjective evaluations, procedural safeguards are not required); Greenholtz v. Inmates of
the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10, 13 (1979) (because decision to
grant parole depends on predictions and subjective evaluations, procedural safeguards are
not required); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (because decison to transfer
inmate is based on little more than "informed predictions," procedural protections are
not required).
42. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 252 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 475 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974). But see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 224 (1976) ("[W]e cannot agree that any change in the conditions of confinement
having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the
protections of the Due Process Clause.") (emphasis in original).
43. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 252 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 475 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974); Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397,
402 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
44. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974) ("[The Wolff statement will] protect the inmate [from] collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of the nature
of the original proceeding.").
45. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983) (administrative segregation does
not affect parole decisions and contains no "stigma of wrongdoing"); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (transfer of inmate to mental hospital has "stigmatizing consequences"); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974) (discipline of inmate may have
"collateral consequences").
46. Compare Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (due process required in
decision to transfer to mental hospital because of the effects the transfer will have on
inmate) and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57, 571 n.19 (1974) (due process
required in disciplinary decision because of the deprivation caused by punishment) and
Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397, 402 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (deprivation caused by solitary confinement triggers due process protections), aff'd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978) with
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976) (deprivation caused by transfer to another prison is insufficient to trigger due process protections).
47. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S.
491, 497-98 (1985); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470 (1983); Jago v. Van Curen, 454
U.S. 14, 18-19 (1981); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980); Greenholtz v. Inmates of
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requirement places on prison administration, the more likely that a court
will impose it.4"

III.
A.

FACTUALLY SPECIFIC WOLFF STATEMENTS ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED

The Nature of Prison DisciplinaryProceedings

A prison disciplinary hearing seeks to determine whether an inmate
violated prison rules and, if so, to punish him for that violation.49 It
gives the inmate the opportunity to defend himself against his accuser
before an impartial factfinding body. In sum, it is an adversarial factfinding proceeding.5 0 The requirement that a decisionmaker produce a factually specific statement of evidence on which it relied in making its
decision is common to such proceedings.51 Thus, the nature of prison
the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1979); Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 561-62 (1974).
48. Compare Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (requiring disciplinary
decision to be based on "modicum of evidence" will not create administrative burden)
and Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980) (interest of the state in avoiding disruption
in prison proceedings does not outweigh the need for procedural safeguards in decision to
transfer inmate to mental hospital) and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 572 (1974)
(procedural protections in prison disciplinary proceeding will not overburden prison administration) with Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 19 (1981) (to hold that a mutual
understanding between inmates and prison officials created a protected liberty interest
would "severely restrict the necessary flexibility of prison administrators") and Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (need
for flexibility in decision to grant parole weighs against court imposed procedural safeguards in parole decisions) and Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1976) (administrative burden inherent in the confrontation and cross-examination of adverse
witnesses militates against allowing these practices in prison disciplinary proceedings);
see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470 (1983) ("There are persuasive reasons why
we should be loath to [apply procedural safegards] to... the day-to-day administration
of a prison system."); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976) (due process clause
should not dictate the day-to-day function of prisons); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 49799 (1985) (requiring prison administration to give reasons at some point for denying inmate opportunity to call witnesses at disciplinary hearing does not create too great an
administrative strain but requiring contemporaneous written reasons might).
49. See eg., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 545-53 (1974) (discussing the disciplinary proceedures in the Nebraska prison system); see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
50. Of course, one of the reasons a procedural safeguard like the Wolff statement is
required in prison disciplinary hearings is the adversarial nature of those proceedings.
See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557; supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. The question to be
addressed, however, is how stringent this procedural safeguard must be. The adversarial
nature of prison disciplinary proceedings weighs in favor of the more stringent, factually
specific interpretation of Wolff statements. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
51. See e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (civil trials); Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c), 32(b)(1),
32(c)(3) (criminal trials); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§§ 2571-82 (discussing Rule 52(a) and the need for factually specific statements of evidence); C. A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 646 (4th ed. 1983) (same); 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.17(f)(2) & (g) (1986) (factually specific statement required in federal prison disciplinary decisions); supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (specific factual statement
required in parole revocation decision).
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disciplinary hearings weighs in favor of requiring specificity in Wolff
statements.
B. The PotentialEffect of A Prison DisciplinaryProceeding
1. Standard of Review
One of the dual purposes of the Wolff statement requirement is to en-

sure fairness in the disciplinary decision. 2 Implicit in the concept of a
fair decision is the notion that the decisionmaker has discovered the relevant facts and based his decision on them. In Superintendent v. Hill5 3
the Supreme Court closed one avenue by which the judiciary could ensure that a fair decision has taken place.
Hill held that a modicum of evidence, anywhere in the record, is all
that is required to uphold a prison disciplinary decision on review.5 4 The
Hill court stressed that reviewing courts should not delve into the record,
assess the credibility of testimony, or weigh evidence. 55 Rather, courts
should merely look for any evidence in the record that supports the disci-

plinary decision.

6

If fairness requires a weighing of the facts and the

courts are not to do this weighing, then the disciplining body must. Consequently, there should be some safeguard to ensure that the disciplining
body has performed this function.
The Wolff statement is meant to be such a safeguard. 7 Requiring a
52. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974). The other purpose is to protect an inmate from unjust collateral consequences resulting from a misunderstanding of
the disciplinary decision. See id.; supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
53. 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
54. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.
55. See id. at 455-56. In Hill, a prison guard had heard a scuffle outside his immediate field of vision and moved to investigate. He came upon a beaten inmate and saw the
two petitioners and a third inmate jogging away. There were no other inmates in the
area. Accused of the beating, the petitioners declared their innocence and the beaten
inmate stated that they had not caused his injuries. Nevertheless, the petitioners were
held responsible and each lost one hundred days of good-time credit as punishment for
the attack. They filed an action in state court alleging violation of their constitutional
rights on the grounds that there was no evidence to link them to the beating. See id. at
447-48. The Court held that the evidentiary burden needed to discipline the petitioners
had been met. See id. at 456.
56. See id. at 455-56.
57. See Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Frey, 807
F.2d 1407, 1412 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1986); State ex rel. Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115,
124-25, 289 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 1980); cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786
(1973) (the requirements set out in Morrissey for parole revocation decisions "in themselves serve as substantial protection against ill-considered revocation"); Coralluzzo v.
New York State Parole Bd., 566 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1977) (written statement of evidence required for parole denial promotes fair decision), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 912
(1978); Shepard v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 1976) (same),
vacatedand remanded, 429 U.S. 1057 (1977); United States ex reL Johnson v. Chairman,
500 F.2d 925, 931 (2d Cir. 1974) (same), vacatedas moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Childs v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (D.D.C. 1973) (same), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, on other grounds, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974). One court that requires factually specific Wo/ff statements has noted that an "important reason for requiring an agency to set forth written reasons for its decision is to force the administrator to
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disciplining body to note the facts on which it has relied ensures that it
has gone through the often difficult process of weighing evidence to un-

cover the truth. 8 As one court observed, "[i]t is impossible to state the
facts relied upon without having discovered the facts." 5 9

go through the decision-making process: to pick and choose among conflicting facts ....
Decision-making is difficult and may be unconsciously avoided unless done in a fixed
way." Meeks, 95 Wis. 2d at 124-25, 289 N.W.2d at 363.
58. State ex rel. Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 124-25, 289 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Ct.
App. 1980). The magnitude of harm that can arise if a disciplining body does not follow
this procedure is exemplified in Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 907 (1981). In Chavis a prison guard had been stabbed while escorting a group
of inmates. Chavis, one of the group, was accused of the stabbing. A hearing was held
and Chavis was cleared. After that, a second officer filed a report saying no more than
that "[t]hrough investigation [Chavis had] been identified as having stabbed [the
wounded officer]." Id. at 1283. Unknown to Chavis, the wounded officer's own report
and a witness's polygraph testimony tended to exonerate him. Id. at 1283-84. Nevertheless, Chavis was found guilty and punished. Id. at 1283. The Wolff statement that he
received merely stated that the disciplining body believed the second officer's report.
Chavis went through two administrative prison appeals before finally being cleared of the
stabbing. He then brought an action in federal court alleging violation of his constitutional rights. See id. at 1284.
The Chavis court stated that the case before it was one that exemplified why factually
specific Wolff statements were necessary to achieve Wolff's goal of ensuring fair decisions. The Chavis court noted that, by the time Chavis was exonerated, he "had spent
five months in segregation. Had the [disciplining body] made detailed findings to begin
with, Chavis may never have been sent to segregation, or, the [reviewing body] may have
been compelled to reverse the [disciplining body's] decision upon its first review." Id. at
1287.
59. Meeks, 95 Wis. 2d at 126, 289 N.W.2d at 364. This notion helps justify the position taken in the Sixth Circuit, that furnishing an inmate a copy of a report that has been
incorporated into a Wolff statement by reference is not sufficient to meet minimum due
process requirements. See King v. Wells, 760 F.2d 89, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1985). Merely
furnishing the inmate with a copy of the report relied on may well inform him of the
evidence against him. It does not, however, assure that the disciplining body weighed the
evidence, considered conflicting testimony, and made the well-considered determination
necessary to meet Wolff's fairness requirement.
The evidentiary standard set out in Hill furnishes an additional reason for requiring
factually specific Wolff statements. The strains that inmate litigation has placed on the
judiciary have been noted by commentators and jurists alike. See, eg., Boyd v. Dutton,
405 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) (Powell, J., dissenting); Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295, 298 (5th
Cir. 1975); Burger, Report on the FederalJudicialBranch - 1973, 59 A.B.A. J. 1125, 1128
(1973); Haas, JudicialPolitics and CorrectionalReform: An Analysis of the Declineof the

"Hands-Off" Doctrine, 1977 Det. C.L. Rev. 795, 821-29 (1977). The Supreme Court has
attempted to reduce this burden through the formation of due process doctrine. See
Glennon, ConstitutionalLiberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Section 1983,
51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 355, 393-97 (1978); Herman, The New Liberty: The ProceduralDue
Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 482,

485 (1984); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 408-09
(1977); see also Hardwick, 517 F.2d at 298 (courts must develop "procedural innovations" to reduce the volume of prisoner suits). A factually specific Wolffstatement would
assist in accomplishing this end. It would facilitate judicial review of prison disciplinary
decisions by ensuring that the modicum of evidence needed to uphold them was readily
available to a reviewing court.
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Collateral Consequences

A second purpose of the Wo/ff statement requirement is to protect inmates from unjust collateral consequences that may result from a misunderstanding of prison disciplinary records." For instance, such a
misunderstanding may lead to a subsequent erroneous decision to transfer an inmate or deny him parole.6 Those in favor of incorporation argue that a collateral reviewing body may look at the whole record of a
disciplinary proceeding, thus precluding any danger of unjust collateral
consequences. 62
There are two problems with this position. First, collateral reviewing
bodies generally do not delve into the record. 63 Second, a collateral deci60. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
61. Id.; see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980) (there is an "inherent risk" of
error in an inmate transfer decision); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (inmate's prison behavior record generally is a
critical factor in the decision of whether to grant him parole); Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 228 (1976) ("(A]n inmate's conduct . . . may often be a major factor in the
decision ... to transfer him .... ); infra note 63 (discussing the potential for misunder-

standing an inmate's prison disciplinary record when making a parole determination).
62. See Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Frey, 807
F.2d 1407, 1412 (8th Cir. 1986). As the Frey court put it, a Wo/ff statement that incorporates a report by reference "guarantees that a reviewing body can fairly and accurately
assess ... the nature of the incident or the propriety of the proceeding ....

[The disci-

plining body] has committed itself to certain evidence, and a review based on established
facts is available." Id. at 1414.
63. The situation regarding parole provides a good example. Although the procedures used in making a parole decision and the basis on which these decisions are made
rarely are articulated in administrative rules or statutes, see N. Cohen & J. Gobert, The
Law of Probabtion and Parole 93 (1983), an inmate's prison behavior record generally is
a critical factor in the decision of whether to grant him parole. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (inmate's prison
behavior record is "critical" in a parole determination); 18 U.S.C. §§ 4165, 4206 (violation of prison rules reduces good-time credits held); 28 C.F.R. § 2.6 (1986) (loss of goodtime credits taken into consideration in federal parole decision); id. at § 2.12(d),
2.14(a)(2)(iii), (b)(4)(i) (disciplinary record affects parole release decision); see also Dye v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376, 1378 (10th Cir. 1977) (loss of good-time
credits "is an indication that a prisoner has violated the rules of the institution to a serious degree").
In the rush to process applications for parole, however, the fine points of a situation
that has resulted in the disciplining of a parole applicant may not be taken into account.
For instance, a recent government report found that a federal inmate's case file (containing convictions, probation report, prison file, etc.) was not seen by parole examiners until
immediately before a parole hearing, generally was reviewed for less than twenty minutes,
and then usually was seen by only one of the two examiners required to vote on the parole
decision. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Sam Nunn on
Federal Parole Practices 24, 25, 51 (July 16, 1982). The report also found that errors in
parole decisions were made 53% of the time and that only 6% of those errors were
corrected through the administrative appeals process. See id. at 51; see also Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980) ("inherent risk" of error in an inmate transfer decision);
State ex reL Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 127-28, 289 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App.
1980) (because parole boards generally do not look into facts behind disciplinary decision, Wolff statements that are not factually specific are likely to lead parole boards to
make erroneous conclusions about the circumstances surrounding such a decision).
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sion based on an erroneous understanding of an inmate's record of prison
conduct will rarely be subject to independent review." Therefore, incorporation by reference does not adequately protect inmates from unjust
collateral consequences arising from prison disciplinary action. On the

other hand, a factually specific Wolff statement helps to ensure that a
collateral reviewing body bases its decision on a more accurate understanding of inmates' disciplinary records, thereby diminishing any concern over the lack of future opportunities for review.
C.

The Administrative Burden

Wolff statements must contain "the evidence relied on" in making the

disciplinary decision.65 Disciplining bodies that issue Wolff statements

that merely incorporate reports by reference are stating that those re-

ports are the items of "evidence" on which their decisions are based."
Requiring these disciplining bodies to mention the relevant facts in those
items of "evidence" would be only slightly more burdensome than incorporation by reference.67
In addition, a factually specific Wolff statement does not create any

greater problems in prison administration than one that is factually
vague. Inmates receive Wolff statements after the disciplining body has

made its decision, thus reducing the risk that a requirement of factual
specificity could be used to disrupt68 the disciplinary hearing itself.69
64. Collateral decisions (like the decision to transfer an inmate or deny him parole)
are predictive in nature. See supra note 36. Thus, these decisions ordinarily do not trigger the due process clause, precluding review by the courts. See id.
65. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).
66. See Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Frey, 807
F.2d 1407, 1412 (8th Cir. 1986); Wells v. Israel, 629 F. Supp. 498, 505 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
The Frey court stated that " Woff requires, in part, that the written statement contain the
'evidence relied on' (emphasis in original). The reports referenced in the adjustment
board's written statement undoubtedly qualify as 'evidence'....." Frey, 807 F.2d at 1413
(citation omitted).
67. Cf. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (because Wolff statement
already required, requiring certain quantum of evidence to support disciplinary decision
will not impose any new administrative burdens); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole,
371 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (D.D.C. 1973) (no administrative burden or delay created by
requirement of factually specific statement in parole denial situation), aff'd in part, vacated in part; on other grounds, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
68. See Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1412 (8th Cir. 1986) (requirement of factually
specific Wolffstatements might be "susceptible to manipulation" by inmates).
69. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. The written statement requirement's lack of disruptive potential sharply separates it from other procedural safeguards that the Supreme
Court chose not to adopt for prison disciplinary proceedings. For instance, the Court
refused to require that an inmate be allowed to call witnesses at disciplinary hearings
because the requirement has an "obvious potential for disruption." Wolff, 418 U.S. at
566; accord Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1985). The Court also refused to hold
that an inmate has a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him because
"[p]roceedings would inevitably be longer and tend to unmanageability." Wolff, 418 U.S.
at 567; accord Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 321 (1976). Similarly, the right to
counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings has not been recognized, partially due to the
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Also, if the disclosure of any particular item of information endangers
personal or institutional safety, it can be excluded from a Wolff statement
at the disciplining body's discretion.70
Moreover, there is a great penological benefit in providing inmates
with factually specific Wolff statements. Prison discipline is meant, in
part, to serve a rehabilitative function. 7 When inmates are told exactly
what they did to bring on punishment they are more likely to be successful in their efforts to modify their behavior.7 2 In addition, by forcing a
disciplining body to weigh the facts, a factually specific Wolff statement
promotes fairness in disciplinary decisions.73 This appearance of fairness
and consistency is likely to lead to a less hostile prison environment.
This result both alleviates administrative burdens and promotes
rehabilitation. 4
delay that might result. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), which employed the identical written statement requirement for parole revocation
decisions as Wolff did for disciplinary action, stated that abuse of the requirements it had
set down could be prevented by the officer in charge of the hearing. See id. at 490.
70. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
71. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 562-63 (1974); Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1412 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1986);
Henderson v. Carlson, No. 86-5270, slip op. at 13 (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 1987).
72. Cf United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 1975)
(factually specific statement of reasons for parole denial serves rehabilitative purposes),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914 (1976); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, 500 F.2d
925, 932 (2d Cir.) (same), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Childs v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (D.D.C. 1973) (same), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, on other grounds, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

73. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
74. See Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1412 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1986) (Wo/ff statement
promotes fair disciplinary decisionmaking, resulting in both rehabilitation and a safer
prison environment); Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397, 403 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
("[The] implementation of fair procedures decreases tensions in prisons and eases the
work of prison administrators."), aff'd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978); cf.Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) ("[F]air treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance
of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness."); People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E.2d 725, 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46 (1961) (failure of
judiciary to protect inmates from arbitrary infringement of their constitutional rights
hampers their rehabilitation by reinforcing the perception of a hostile, unjust society);
Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of JudicialRefusal to Review the Com-

plaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506, 524-26 (1963) (same).
Ironically, the Eighth Circuit, which allows incorporation by reference, has produced
perhaps the most articulate expression of the penological value of a specific factual
statement:
[A Wolff statement] promotes consistent and fair board action. This fosters
rehabilitation and leads to a less hostile relationship between inmates and prison
officials. When inmates are disciplined only after being apprised of the evidence
and reasons that led to the disciplinary action, the rehabilitative goals of the
institution and the quest for a peaceful prison atmosphere are advanced by negatively reinforcing, in a non-arbitrary fashion, acceptable inmate behavior.
Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1412 n.5 (8th Cir. 1985).
The Wolff court implied that limiting the information in a Wolff statement ordinarily
would not serve any rehabilitative purpose:
It may be that there will be occasions when personal or institutional safety is so
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D. The Supreme Court has Implied That a Wolff Statement Must be
Factually Specific
The Supreme Court has implied that Wolff statements should be factu-

ally specific. For instance, in Wolff itself, the Court stated that there may
"be occasions when personal or institutional safety is so implicated that

the statement may properly exclude certain items of evidence, but in that
event the statement should indicate the fact of the omission.""'

If the

incorporation of a report by reference constitutes "evidence" sufficient to

satisfy the written statement requirement,76 then this exception is superfluous. 77 Indeed, the exception is meaningful only if a Wolff statement is
ordinarily required to be factually specific. It would then signify that

relevant facts could be excluded from the Wolff statement only if disclo-

sure might endanger personal or institutional safety.7"
The Supreme Court gave further guidance as to the proper interpretation of "evidence" in Superintendent v. Hill. "9 In Hill, the Court held
that "some evidence" is required to appear in the record in order for a
reviewing court to uphold a decision to discipline an inmate.' The
Court said that this evidentiary requirement would not place any new
burdens on prison administration because "the written statement mandated by Wolff [already] requires a disciplinary board to explain the evidence relied upon."'" It is significant that the Court used the term
"explain" rather than "list." Those in favor of incorporation by reference argue that a report incorporated by reference is no less an item of
implicated that the statement may properly exclude certain items of evidence,
but in that event the statement should indicate the fact of the omission. Otherwise, we perceive no conceivable [disruption of] rehabilitative objective[s] ...
that can flow from the requirement of these statements.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974); see also King v. Wells, 760 F.2d 89, 93
(6th Cir. 1985) (interpreting the quoted passage as requiring factual specificity in Wolff
statements).
75. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
76. This is the position taken by those favoring incorporation by reference. Saenz v.
Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1412 (8th
Cir. 1986).
77. For instance, if a fellow inmate informs on an inmate facing disciplinary action,
the informant's safety might be endangered if his identity were revealed. The passage
quoted from Wolff allows the disciplinary body to base its decision on the informant's
testimony without revealing his identity (or even the facts from his testimony) in the
Wolff statement. See, eg., Rinehart v. Brewer, 483 F. Supp. 165, 170 (S.D. Iowa 1980);
Guzman v. Coughlin, 90 A.D.2d 666, 666, 456 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (1982); Gross v. Henderson, 79 A.D.2d 1086, 1087, 435 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1981). The disciplining body
must, however, indicate the fact of omission. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565. For example, words
such as "found guilty based on an informant's confidential testimony" would be required.
If a Wolff statement allows incorporation by reference, then only a statement such as
"found guilty based on the guard's report" would be required. See supra note 5. Thus, if
incorporation by reference were allowed, there would be no need to create an exception
where safety concerns were implicated.
78. See King v. Wells, 760 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1985).
79. 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
80. Id. at 454.
81. Id. at 455.
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evidence than a specifically identified fact.82 They would argue, for instance, that the statement "the disciplinary board believes the officer's

report on the incident" is, for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements
of a Wolff statement, equivalent to "the inmate was found with a knife."
However, the latter example can be viewed as self-explanatory evidence
for a disciplinary decision. The former can not. Thus, in noting that a
Wolff statement must explain the evidence on which the decisionmaker
relied, the
Hill decision implies that a Wolff statement is to be factually
83
specific.

E. The Level of Protection Should Not be Diminished
It is undisputed that the written statement of evidence required under
Morrissey v. Brewer 4 for parole revocation must be factually specific.8 5

One argument in favor of allowing the incorporation of a report by reference in a Wolff statement is that an inmate's liberty interest in a disciplinary proceeding is not equal to that of a parolee in a parole revocation
hearing.8 6 However, this argument fails to take account of one essential

fact: this discrepency was addressed in the formulation of the Wolff
82. See supra note 66.
83. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), also gives an indication of the Court's
awareness that Wolff statements ought to be factually specific. In Baxter the Court said
that
[d]ue to the peculiar environment of the prison setting, it may be that certain
facts relevant to the disciplinary determination do not come to light until after
the formal hearing. It would be unduly restrictive to require that suchfacts be
excluded from consideration .... In so stating, however, we in no way diminish our holding in Wolff that "there must be a 'written statement by the
factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action."
Id. at 322 n.5 (quoting Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972))) (emphasis added). A Wolff statement is
meant to protect an inmate by giving him a documented basis for the decision to discipline him that he can use to defend his rights. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565
(1974). The holding in Baxter applied to facts affecting the decision that surfaced after
the hearing. Thus, the inmate was not apprised of these facts prior to or during the
hearing. In stating that the use of these facts does not diminish the Wolff statement
requirement, the Court implied that the Wolffstatement is the natural vehicle for informing the inmate of these newly discovered facts. The only way that a Wolff statement can
do this is if it is factually specific.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the written statement required in Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), for parole revocation decisions also lends some support to
the view that Wolff statements should be interpreted as being fact specific. In Black v.
Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985), the Court indicated that it considers the statement required in Morrissey to be factually specific. See id. at 613-14; supra note 15 and accompanying text. Since the statement required in Wolff is identical to that required in
Morrissey, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text, it follows that Wolffstatements
should be factually specific.
84. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
85. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
86. See Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1410-11 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Wolff, 418
U.S. at 560-61 (discussing the difference between liberty interests held by a parolee and an
inmate); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972) (discussing the liberty interest
held by a parolee).
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statement requirement. The Court in Wolff v. McDonnell"7 refused to
adopt all of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Morrissey v.
Brewer8" precisely because inmates in a disciplinary proceeding have a
more limited liberty interest at stake than parolees in a revocation hearing.89 This difference in the magnitude of liberty interests is reflected in
the number of procedural safeguards retained by the Wolff decision, not
in the level of protection afforded by any particular safeguard.9' One of
the few safeguards that the Wolff Court chose to retain was the written
statement requirement. 91 The attendant degree of specificity of this retained procedural safeguard should not be diminished92 in order to account, a second time, 93 for the difference in the liberty interests involved.
CONCLUSION

In determining the level of procedural protection due an inmate facing
the loss of a liberty interest, the Supreme Court has looked to the nature
of the decision affecting that liberty interest, the immediate and collateral
effects the decision may have on the inmate, and the extent to which a
proposed procedural safeguard will burden prison administration.
A disciplinary proceeding is an adversarial proceeding resulting in a
factual determination of guilt. Furthermore, a disciplinary decision contains the danger of collateral harm. These factors suggest the need for
greater procedural protections. A factually specific Wolff statement is
more protective than one that merely incorporates a report by reference.
In addition, the penological benefits resulting from a factually specific
Wolff statement greatly outweigh the minimal administrative burden involved in producing it.
Therefore, the concerns that guide the courts in the area of inmates'
procedural due process rights weigh in favor of a factually specific Wolff
statement. Moreover, in light of the minimal evidentiary burden borne
by the state in attempting to uphold a disciplinary decision on review and
87. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
88. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). For a listing of the procedural safeguards enunciated in
Morrissey, see supra note 12.
89. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974); supra notes 20-21 and ac-

companying text; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972) (discussing
the liberty interest held by a parolee).

90. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-84 (1972) (discussing the numerous procedural safeguards required in a parole revocation decision) and supra note 12
(same) with Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66 (retaining only two of the Morrissey standards).
91. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974).
92. Lower courts, and apparently the Supreme Court, interpret the written statement
required in Morrissey to be fact specific. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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the unreviewability of many "collateral" decisions, factual specificity represents the best method of ensuring that the purposes behind the Wolff
statement requirement are fulfilled. Although the Supreme Court has
never ruled on the issue, it has implied a requirement of factual specificity when speaking about the Wo/ffstatement. This implication should be
followed.
Michael A. Guzzo

